Antietam: A Perspective

Some may be aware of an article of mine that was recently published in Strategy & Tactics Magazine. Suffice it to say that I was very disappointed with the editing job that was performed on the piece. For anyone who is interested, here is the article as submitted to Strategy & Tactics. Please feel free to share it. The fully annotated version is available upon request. THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM: A PERSPECTIVE By Maurice G. D'Aoust The Battle of Antietam is typically remembered as the bloodiest single day of the American Civil War and more conspicuously, for enabling Abraham Lincoln to issue his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Otherwise, this monumental struggle has been relegated to a comparative footnote in the history of the war, having been overshadowed by the equally tumultuous though no more consequential Battle of Gettysburg. Both contests ended in a stalemate following which Confederate General Robert E. Lee was forced to give up the field and march his severely depleted army back to Virginia. There is, however, one significant difference between the two battles that sets Antietam apart. At Gettysburg the Union army, under George Meade, had stood on the defensive whereas, at Antietam, it took the offensive. In command on September 17, 1862 was the ever-controversial George B. McClellan. With but few exceptions, historians have heaped the bulk of the blame for the failure to decimate Lee’s army that day squarely on McClellan’s shoulders. At first glance it's easy to agree with this popular notion but upon closer examination, it becomes clear that others including Joseph Hooker, Edwin V. Sumner, Ambrose E. Burnside and even Abraham Lincoln were equally if not more culpable than McClellan. McClellan's plan for the battle was simple enough: Cross Antietam Creek, turn Lee's left flank with Hooker's 1st and Joseph K. Mansfield's 12th Corps, supported, if necessary, by Sumner's 2nd Corps. Whether as a diversion or in conjunction with the main attack, Burnside's 9th Corps was to cross the creek at Rohrbach Bridge and advance on the Confederate right. Once one or both of these flank attacks was successful, McClellan intended to throw everything he could spare against Lee’s center. The success of any battle plan depends largely on those to whom its implementation has been entrusted. In that regard, Lee wrote, "Be content to do what you can for the well-being of what properly belongs to you; commit the rest to those who are responsible." To that end, McClellan spent the better part of the 16th "obtaining information as to the ground, rectifying the position of the troops, and perfecting the arrangements for the attack." Sometime on the 16th, possibly even that morning, McClellan gave Hooker his instructions for the next day. According to Hooker, McClellan also stipulated that any and all reinforcements as might be forwarded to him (Mansfield, Sumner etc.) would fall under his command. In other words, Hooker would have total control of the field on the Union right. Clearly, McClellan must have had considerable faith in Hooker's abilities, that faith having doubtless been derived from "Fighting Joe's" glowing performance on the Peninsula and at South Mountain only days before Antietam. At 4 p.m. on the 16th Hooker marched his columns across Antietam Creek and took up a position on Lee's left flank, from where he was to commence his attack the next morning. At 8:45 a.m. on the 16th George D. Ruggles, McClellan's aide de camp, sent Sumner a message urging him to "hurry up Banks' [Mansfield's] Corps" which was then bivouacked roughly two miles west of Keedysville. At about 9:30 a.m. Ruggles followed this up with a second message, "Gen. McClellan desires you to inform him the moment the head of Mansfield's corps comes up. The general will be for the present at Gen. Hooker's headquarters." From this it must be surmised that, as early as 8:45 a.m., McClellan was formulating his plan and that it somehow involved the 12th Corps, i.e. that it had been designated to support the 1st in its attack. So too would he have informed Hooker of this fact. Mansfield reached Keedysville sometime that afternoon and at 5:50 p.m. McClellan ordered Sumner to detach the 12th and send it forward to Hooker. Once again, the order was issued by Ruggles and reads: "General McClellan desires you to move Mansfield's corps across the fords and bridge over the Antietam and to take such position as may be designated for it by General Hooker . . . " What Sumner's exact instructions to Mansfield were is unknown but at 11:30 that night - a curiously late jump-off when considering Ruggles's order had been issued close to six hours earlier - the 12th Corps stepped off toward Hooker's position. There are indications that Sumner may have contested Mansfield’s detachment, arguing that he should lead both the 2nd and 12th Corps onto the field. Whether Sumner held the 12th back pending the results of these protestations is impossible to know. It was 2 a.m. before Mansfield finally halted his column one or so miles to Hooker's left/rear and it must be wondered why he stopped so far back? Equally perplexing is why Hooker made no effort to communicate with Mansfield? Then again, why would Mansfield not have sent a rider ahead, informing Hooker of the 12th's arrival on the field and requesting instructions? Ruggles's 5:50 p.m. directive could not have made McClellan's intentions any clearer; Hooker was expected to assign Mansfield his position, presumably on the 1st Corps's left or slightly to its rear where the 12th could be held in close tactical support. Obviously, someone - Sumner, Hooker, Mansfield or all of them - had seriously dropped the ball. Of them all, it is Hooker who must bear the bulk of the blame. Having doubtless been made aware that the 12th Corps was being sent to his support, it was Hooker's responsibility to position those troops in preparation for the coming battle. Why else would Ruggles have stipulated that this was to be the case? Yet, for reasons unknown, Hooker took no measures to communicate with or effect a link-up with Mansfield. As it transpired, Mansfield had yet to receive a single communication from Hooker when the contest opened sometime between 5:30 and 6 a.m. It's easy to imagine that Mansfield would have been somewhat perplexed as to why the battle had commenced without his Corps. Whatever the case, he now took matters into his own hands. His troops, having themselves been "aroused from a brief slumber by sharp firing of musketry," were immediately put in motion toward the sound of the fighting. Meanwhile McClellan, his view of the extreme Union right flank being entirely blocked by terrain, would have been unaware of the considerable gap that still existed between the 1st and 12th Corps. By the time the lead elements of the 12th Corps arrived on the scene, sometime between 7 and 7:30 a.m., Hooker's command was in shambles and struggling to fend off the enemy's ever-increasing numbers. “It was evident that Hooker’s troops were giving way. His general officers were hurrying towards us begging for support in every direction,” wrote General Alpheus Williams. It was in the midst of this mayhem that Hooker finally ordered the 12th Corps into the fray. Almost immediately Mansfield, as a direct result of his poor understanding of affairs, was mortally wounded when struck by musketry fire coming from what he had mistakenly believed were Union troops. By then, the 1st Corps had effectively retired to the rear and it was now entirely up to the 12th to contend with the enemy. One of Mansfield's brigades, Green’s, did manage to make some headway but in the end it too was forced to withdraw. By 9 a.m. the 12th Corps had shot its bolt and Lee's left had held, albeit by the skin of its teeth. "If the corps of Mansfield had been at hand while this action was being fought, the result might very possibly have been the overwhelming of the troops which constituted the left of the Army of Northern Virginia; but that corps, though starting at the first sound of the cannon, had a mile and a half to march before reaching the field," writes John C. Ropes. For this negligence Hooker and Hooker alone is responsible. All told, McClellan had placed close to 16,000 troops at his immediate disposal. Rather than utilizing that force to its full effectiveness, as McClellan must certainly have intended, Hooker threw his and Mansfield's Corps into the battle on a piecemeal basis. Indeed, had the 1st and 12th acted in concert at the battle's outset, the Confederate left (initially numbering 7,700 and thus outnumbered by better than 2 to 1 against those 16,000 troops) would, as Ropes suggests, have most likely been overwhelmed and forced to fall back. Why Hooker chose to commence his attack without having first brought the 12th Corps forward to his immediate support is a matter for speculation. That he would have done so in order to avoid his having to share in any resulting glory is a possibility that can not be dismissed. "He [Hooker] was not subordinate to his superiors. He was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. His disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command," wrote Ulysses S. Grant. Whatever Hooker's reasoning may have been for not bringing the 12th Corps forward, his decision to attack without proper support severely diminished the chances of a major Union victory at Antietam. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ SIDEBAR McClellan and Overestimating “[I]t must be said without reservation that it is impossible to believe that McClellan believed on the Peninsula or in Maryland the Confederates had the force he attributed to them,” wrote Colonel Francis W. Palfrey. Clearly, McClellan had a penchant for overstating the enemy's strength throughout his Civil War career. There is, however, good reason to believe that, for the most part, he had a fairly good inkling of the true numbers he was up against throughout 1861/62. If the indications are correct, he may have purposely inflated those numbers in a Machiavellian-styled attempt at spurring the Lincoln administration into furnishing him with what would ultimately have equated to a two or possibly three to one advantage over his opponents' actual numbers. In fact, a two or three-to-one superiority conformed precisely with the military philosophy of the day. Much to his chagrin, however, McClellan never did succeed in attaining a two, let alone a three, to one advantage over the Army of Northern Virginia, such as Ulysses S. Grant would enjoy in 1864/65. In September, 1862, McClellan credited Lee with as many as 120,000 troops. That he could possibly have believed in that figure is doubtful in the extreme and his decidedly offensive strategy for the Battle of Antietam would go far in substantiating that premise. On the same token, it is fairly certain that he was not aware of his own superiority (71,000 "effectives" to Lee's estimated 40,000 or 1.8 to 1.) Although strictly a best guess, McClellan probably believed he was facing an enemy whose strength approached his own, thereby illustrating how he, like so many other Civil War commanders, was indeed capable of bona-fide overestimates. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ The events surrounding the 2nd Corps's movements, on the morning of September 17th, have been a continuous source of controversy. Typically, the debate revolves around two aspects. The first deals with McClellan's insistence on waiting until 7:20 a.m. before ordering the 2nd forward. The second aspect concerns 2nd Corps commander Edwin V. Sumner and the extent to which he should be held accountable for the mishandling of his Corps's advance and the ultimate rout of John Sedgwick's division. As to why McClellan would have held the 2nd Corps back, there are at least three factors that, individually or in combination, may have affected his rationale. Firstly, and as already mentioned, McClellan was likely of the impression Hooker would have brought Mansfield forward before commencing his offensive and thus that 16,000 troops were poised to attack Lee's left flank when the battle opened. Under these circumstances, he would have been entirely correct in concluding that Hooker had an adequate force and that the 2nd Corps should be held in tactical reserve pending the development of events. Secondly, it is possible that McClellan may have held the 2nd Corps back simply to avoid crowding the battlefield with 30,000 men who, having been crammed into such a relatively small area, would have made easy fodder for Confederate artillerists. Lastly, although he may not have been in earnest about that 120,000 figure, McClellan did, nevertheless, overrate the enemy's strength that day. This, of course, would have rendered him more cautious than he might otherwise have been, thereby impacting his decision to withhold Sumner. Which of these or other factors played the largest role in that decision may never be known. Of the two divisions that did take part in the 2nd Corps's advance, one, French's, became detached from the other when it veered south after crossing Antietam Creek. The second, Sedgwick's, was routed as it was advancing through the West Woods. Brave to a fault, "Bull" Sumner was a headstrong if not impetuous military man with a "damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" approach to warfare. It is these very traits to which the 2nd Corps fiasco can be attributed. As well as directing that Mansfield be sent forward to Hooker's support, Ruggles's 5:50 p.m. communication of the 16th also instructed Sumner "to have the other corps of your command ready to march one hour before daylight to-morrow morning." To Sumner's way of thinking, this implied that the 2nd Corps would be taking part in the opening attack. It is apparent, however, that McClellan was simply taking measures to ensure the 2nd was ready to move at a moment's notice and as dictated by the morning's events. According to Sumner, his Corps "was ready to move at the time ordered." As the minutes ticked by and no marching orders arrived, he grew more and more impatient and by all indications, was wound up tighter than a drum by the time he finally received the order to advance. Recently discovered in the 2nd Corps's correspondences by Marion Armstron, the order reads: "The Comdg. General directs that you move Sedgwick and French across the creek by the fords which Capt. Custer will point out to you. You will cross in as solid a mass as possible and communicate with Genl. Hooker immediately. Genl. Richardson's Division will not cross till further orders. You will cross your artillery over the bridge and halt after you cross until you ascertain if Genl. Hooker wants assistance." Sedgwick's troops took up the march almost immediately but French's division was slower in its preparations and lagged behind by ten or more minutes. This is difficult to understand when considering the entire Corps was supposed to have been "ready to march" since before daylight. What Sumner's reaction to French's delay may have been is unknown but chafing to get underway, he rode on ahead with Sedgwick, leaving French behind to catch up. After crossing Antietam Creek, Sumner brought Sedgwick's columns to a halt but, still too impatient to wait for French, he resumed the march after a brief pause. It wasn't too long afterward that French's division came splashing across Antietam Creek but rather than following Sumner's route, it veered south, to a distance beyond where it could provide any immediate support to Sedgwick. Ultimately French's division, later joined by Israel B. Richardson's, would become embroiled in an entirely unplanned four hour bloodbath with D.H. Hill's troops in the Sunken Road area. There are several theories surrounding French's decision to veer southward, one being that he mistook some remnants of the 12th Corps (Green), then in the Dunker Church area, for Sedgwick's troops. More recently, it has been suggested that it was Sumner who ordered French to head south. Whatever the reason, there can be little doubt that French's detachment from the rest of 2nd Corps had a severe impact on subsequent events. Champing at the bit to get into the fray, Sumner pressed forward without French, subsequently leading Sedgwick's division into the West Woods where it was struck from the left and rear by newly arrived Rebel troops (Early, McLaws and Walker.) Within minutes Sedgwick's men were streaming for safety under a hail of musketry that, at times, was coming from three directions. Sedgwick himself suffered three wounds during that action and would spend months recovering. Sumner has been severely criticized for the West Woods debacle, the accusations ranging from his having supposedly brushed off attempts to brief him on the enemy's dispositions, to the contention he sent Sedgwick forward in an improper formation and without the benefit of an adequate reconnaissance. "Not a regiment was in column—there was absolutely no preparation for facing to the right or left in case either of their exposed flanks should be attacked. The total disregard of all ordinary military precaution in their swift and solitary advance was so manifest that it was observed and criticized as the devoted band moved on," wrote Francis W. Palfrey who was one of the participants in the affair. However true or false these and other allegations may be, the result of Sumner's "attack" speaks for itself. When McClellan ordered the 2nd Corps forward he would have done so with the expectation of bringing just over 11,000 fresh Union troops to bear against Lee's exhausted and severely depleted left flank. In fact, even when taking Early, McLaws and Walker's troops into account Sedgwick and French would have outnumbered the enemy by better than 2.5 to 1. Of course that advantage was halved when French became detached but even then Sumner still outnumbered the Confederates by over 1,000 men. Indeed, an additional 4,700 Union troops - remnants of Hooker's and Mansfield's commands - were available nearby but, too impatient to coordinate matters, Sumner forged ahead with his sole division. In the blink of an eye, however, Sedgwick's men were scattered like leaves to the wind and what hopes McClellan may have pinned on Sumner's advance withered and died before they'd even had the opportunity to take root. For all intents and purposes, the battle on the Union right was over. There is one final criticism surrounding Sumner's advance and for which Hooker must, once again, be held accountable. At about 8 a.m. a messenger arrived at Army Headquarters with a series of flag dispatches from Hooker to McClellan. According to one eyewitness account, McClellan read the messages then turned to those around him and exclaimed, "All goes well; Hooker is driving them." Clearly, Hooker had grossly mislead McClellan regarding the true state of affairs on the Union right. Not only had he not made his commander aware that the bulk of the 1st Corps had quit the field by then, but so too had he concealed the fact that these critical events now hinged solely on the 12th Corps, half of whose regiments were comprised of new and untrained levies. Encouraged by Hooker's rose-tinted report, McClellan immediately brought Sumner, then marching onto the field, up to date on affairs. Sent at 8:30 a.m., the message reads, "Gnl. Hooker appears to be driving the enemy rapidly. If he does not require your assistance on his right, please push up on the left through the ravine at the head of which the house was burned this morning, getting possession of the woods to the right as soon as possible & push on toward Sharpsburg and a little to its rear as rapidly as possible. Use your artillery freely." Whether or not it was this communication that ultimately prompted Sumner to march Sedgwick into the West Woods or possibly even caused him to order French to veer south is unknown. There can be no doubt, however, that had McClellan been aware of the true situation, he would have handled matters quite differently. Certainly, he would never have asked Sumner to take the West Woods and, from there, push on to Sharpsburg but rather, would most likely have ordered him to provide aid to Mansfield's Corps. Under these circumstances and especially had French also been present, there can be little doubt that Lee's left flank would have crumbled. As these events were transpiring, some 65,000 troops were sitting idle in Washington while the rest of the Army of the Potomac was fighting and dying along the banks of the Antietam. In the days preceding the battle, McClellan had made repeated calls for those troops. Despite these requests and his wholly accurate assurances that the bulk of Lee's army was on his front and that Washington was safe against a secondary attack, he could not pry those 65,000 men from Lincoln's clutches. Interestingly, those additional troops would have given McClellan a veritable 3:1 advantage over his opponent. Even on the basis the general did credit Lee with 70,000 effectives, he would still have been of the impression he possessed a 1.7:1 superiority and would, presumably have been more inclined to take risks that day. What might have been accomplished at Antietam with those additional troops can only be surmised and for his refusal to release them, Lincoln must be made to share in the blame for the Union's failure to gain a decisive victory at Antietam. There is, however, yet another aspect for which the President must be held accountable. In April 1862 Lincoln committed what one historian has referred to as one of the greatest blunders of the Civil War by authorizing the closing of the national recruiting stations. Not only did this measure considerably hamper efforts during the Peninsula Campaign but so too did it have an impact on matters at Antietam. It was June 6th before Lincoln authorized the re-opening of the stations but this would prove to be too little too late. Finally, in July, the President issued a call for an additional 300,000 men and followed this up in August with another call for 300,000 nine-month militia. According to a recent study conducted by D. Scott Hartwig, roughly twenty percent of McClellan's force was made up of these raw recruits. Untrained and often poorly equipped, most of these men would prove to be no match against Lee's hardened veterans. McClellan would have been painfully aware of this fact. Lee too was quite cognizant of this large influx of new Union levies and would have devised his battle tactics accordingly. On September 3rd he wrote President Jefferson Davis "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field. If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." By then, Lincoln must have surely recognized the folly in closing those recruiting station back in April. On the Union left flank, Ambrose E. Burnside was charged with the task of getting the Ninth Corps across Rohrbach bridge and assaulting Lee's right flank. As events transpired, Burnside flittered away the entire morning in a series of disjointed attacks before finally taking the bridge at 1 p.m. To make matters worse, another two hours would pass before he finally initiated his formal attack against Lee's right. At one point during the afternoon attack it appeared as though the 9th might actually succeed in cutting Lee off from his sole avenue of escape over the Potomac River. As in Sedgwick's case, however, the 9th was itself forced to withdraw when struck on the flank by A.P. Hill's Light Division, which had only just arrived from Harper's Ferry. Perplexing as this sorry episode may be, there is more to it than meets the eye. According to McClellan, the first in a string of repeat orders instructing Burnside to assail the bridge was issued at 8 a.m., presumably as a consequence of Hooker's encouraging 8 a.m. dispatch. Some historians maintain that McClellan concocted the story of an 8 a.m. order, referring to it as "a cover up" or "corruption of the facts." This is difficult to understand when considering the existence of a compelling piece of evidence supporting McClellan’s claim. In November 1894, while responding to an inquiry on the matter of the initial order, John Moulder Wilson, the man who carried it, wrote General D. S. Stanley, “In my diary now before me, written at the time, (original author’s emphasis) I find as follows: ‘At 8 o’clock A.M. I carried an order from Genl. McClellan to Genl. Burnside to charge and take the bridge in front of him and the heights beyond.” By 1894 Wilson was a highly respected senior military engineer (subsequently appointed Chief of Engineers in 1899) as well as a recent Superintendent of West Point. It is difficult to believe that he would have jeopardized his reputation by lying about such matters. Then again, McClellan’s official report in which he disclosed the 8 a.m. order was published by the Government Printing Office in February 1864 and was available for all, including Burnside, to read. There is no record of Burnside ever contesting McClellan's claim surrounding an 8 a.m. order. In his official report Burnside proposed that the order to advance did not reach him until 10 a.m. and this notwithstanding the fact virtually all other time-specific reports, including that of his immediate subordinate, placed it at or about 9 o'clock. Generally, historians have subscribed to Burnside's account. A recent study, however, goes far in proving that the order which finally prompted Burnside to open his attack on the bridge did, in fact, reach him at about 9 a.m. and, moreover, that Burnside lied about a 10 a.m. receipt. Indeed, on the basis that McClellan and Wilson were being truthful, it would appear that Burnside ignored at least two previous orders, including McClellan's 8 a.m. communication. Why he would have done so is a matter for serious study. In truth, Burnside had shown little initiative that day. He and McClellan had been at odds recently and matters seem to have come to a head when, out of necessity, McClellan detached Hooker's Corps from Burnside's command thus leaving the disgruntled "wing" commander with a single corps - his own 9th. Even as recently as the morning of the 17th, McClellan had officially chastised Burnside for his repeated failure to comply with various orders. Convinced that taking personal charge of his old Corps would be tantamount to accepting McClellan’s perceived slight, Burnside insisted that Jacob D. Cox remain in temporary command of the 9th. In a petulant display, he arbitrarily forwarded McClellan's orders on to Cox, resulting in a very convoluted command structure. To make matters worse, neither Burnside nor Cox ever ordered a proper reconnaissance of the ground, resulting in such blunders as an entire brigade being taken completely out of the action after becoming hopelessly lost in some woods. Whether Burnside may, in any way, have been responsible for Isaac P. Rodman's division wasting valuable time trying to find a ford by which to cross the creek and outflank the Rebels defending the bridge is a burning question. Traditionally, historians have blamed McClellan's engineers for this foul-up but the evidence supporting that theory is far from convincing and a serious, in-depth study of these events begs to be conducted. In this regard Ezra Carman makes an interesting comment when he writes, "It can be stated upon unquestionable authority that had he [Cox] felt that he was in responsible command he would not have depended upon reconnaissances made by McClellan's engineers and aides for knowledge of the crossings of the stream, but would have ascertained that matter in person, and that he would have had two divisions at Snavely's Ford, before 10 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, ready to cross when McClellan gave the order to attack." Whatever truth there may be in Carman’s statement, the sadder truth is that someone, either Cox, Burnside or both of them should have looked after these critical matters. "In an offensive when the saving of an hour or even half an hour might well have changed the course of the battle, Burnside had required five hours to launch his potentially decisive assault," writes Stephen W. Sears. In fact, Burnside had required no less than six (9 a.m. to 3 p.m.) or very possibly seven hours (8 a.m. to 3 p.m.) What’s more, he then sought to subtract substantially from those crucial hours by claiming the initial order was received at 10 a.m. When it came time to tally up, however, no amount of subtraction was going to change the final sum of Burnside's actions that day. Generally, historians have written this affair off to Burnside’s ineptness and given a five-hour time span (10 a.m. to 3 p.m.,) that view might, with a considerable stretch of the imagination, be credible. On the other hand, the squandering of six or very possibly seven hours, can only be viewed as gross negligence bordering on willful intent, thus prompting Francis W. Palfrey to write, " . . . it is one of the vexed questions of this battle whether Burnside failed McClellan and virtually lost the battle for him, or rather kept it from being a great victory . . .." Indeed, whereas Hooker and Sumner had hampered the success of McClellan’s plan, Burnside had assured its failure _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ SIDEBAR Antietam Red Herrings McClellan is sometimes criticized for sending Hooker across Antietam Creek on the 16th, the contention being that, in doing so, he had thrown away any chance of surprise by telegraphing his punch to Lee. There are several weaknesses in this theory. Firstly, McClellan was not planning a surprise attack. Secondly, Lee had posted scouts at all key crossing points, thus eliminating any possibility of surprise. Thirdly, even had Hooker crossed the creek on the 17th, Lee, his position being ideal for the rapid transfer of troops from one sector to another, would have reacted precisely as he did on the 16th by promptly shifting units to the threatened area. Quite simply, it would have been impossible for McClellan to have achieved any measure of surprise during his opening movements, whether they had taken place on the 16th or 17th. Another popular red herring deals with the notion that McClellan's plan may, in part, have failed as a result of his supposedly not sharing it with his subordinates. McClellan's orders to Hooker, Sumner and Burnside could not have been more explicit and it must be wondered how the sharing of his plan - simple as it was - could have impacted matters, let alone prevented the comedy of errors perpetrated by Hooker, Sumner and Burnside. Then again, it is difficult to believe that McClellan would have stayed entirely mute on the subject of his plan, particularly as it relates to Hooker with whom he had had at least two meetings on the 16th. Whether Burnside, Sumner or even Hooker did know the full details of McClellan's plan is unknown but, in the whole scheme of things, it must be wondered what role this knowledge could have played in preventing the ultimate botching of their respective attacks. Finally, some historians have criticized McClellan for failing to deploy his cavalry on Burnside's left flank, the argument being that their presence there might have prevented the calamity that transpired when A.P. Hill came on the scene at 3:40 p.m. This criticism overlooks two very important facts. Firstly, there were twelve companies of cavalry at Burnside’s immediate disposal throughout that day. While not a substantial force, these troopers would have been more than adequate for scouting purposes and the record confirms that several companies were, in fact, sent out on reconnoitering expeditions that afternoon. For whatever reason, these patrols failed to uncover Hill's approach. In addition to those twelve mounted companies, however, Burnside's left flank was also being watched by the Union signal station atop Elk Mountain. According to Lieut J. Glokoski, acting signal officer, Elk Mountain offered an excellent vantage of the enemy's lines. Throughout the afternoon of the 17th, Glokoski and his signalmen kept Burnside well apprised on the enemy's movements. In fact, at 3 p.m., just as the 9th Corps was commencing its long overdue attack on Lee's right, Glokoski's flagmen warned Burnside of A.P. Hill's approach from Harper's Ferry when they signaled, "Look out well on your left; the enemy are moving a strong force in that direction," According to Glokoski, "This warning was in time, and it was noticed by General Burnside." For whatever reason, Glokoski's account has been discounted by most historians who, instead, are of the opinion the message either never reached Burnside or arrived too late. Nevertheless, given all of the facts, it becomes clear that more than adequate resources, including cavalry, were in place with which to monitor the 9th Corps’ left flank. Then again, “If this important movement had been consummated two hours earlier, a position would have been secured upon the heights from which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear,” writes McClellan. From atop those same heights and with the benefit of that two hours lead-time, so too would the Ninth Corps have been in a much better position to repulse Hill’s advance. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ Not surprisingly, McClellan has been brought to task for his refusal to commit his last reserves in an all-or-nothing gamble to crush Lee. Of course, the fact he overrated his opponent's strength would have had some impact on that decision though this certainly would not have been his sole and overriding consideration. The disappointing events of the day; Baltimore and Washington hanging in the balance; the prospect of foreign intervention in the event of a defeat; the very real specter of an ensuing court martial at the hands of the Radical Republican faction following such a defeat; these and other factors would have all had some influence on McClellan's reasoning. There are some who blame Sumner for influencing McClellan in his decision to call off the offensive but in the final analysis, it is the Commander of the Army of the Potomac who must be made to take full responsibility. The call was his alone to make and right or wrong, his decision to withhold Porter and Franklin was not as straightforward as we would like to think. McClellan must, of course, be made to share in the blame for the outcome of the battle, though certainly not to the extent as some have suggested. Clearly, he can not be faulted for Hooker's piecemeal tactics. Neither can he be held accountable for Sumner's total mismanagement of his Corps's advance and the routing of Sedgwick's division. Both Hooker’s and Sumner's attacks should have succeeded in crushing Lee's left flank and it is strictly due to their respective bungling of affairs that this portion of McClellan's plan failed. In each instance McClellan had allocated more than sufficient troops with which to get the job done and it is difficult to imagine how, with the exception of possibly sending Sumner in earlier, he could have better co-ordinated these movements. If McClellan can be at all faulted for the Ninth Corps's failings that day it would be for his not relieving Burnside of command. The story goes that, at 1 o'clock, McClellan sent Colonel Thomas M. Key out with orders to relieve the wing commander if he did not resume his attack after crossing the bridge but the order was never acted upon. In retrospect, McClellan would have been wiser to have arbitrarily relieved Burnside at that point or possibly even earlier. Based on the morning's events and those of the previous days, he certainly had more than ample cause to do so. It is, with the benefit of hindsight, easy for us to criticize McClellan for his refusal to commit Porter and Franklin late that afternoon. In many respects, he should have but having already fought the bloodiest single day of the entire war, McClellan thought better of it. Perhaps, like future General J.F.C. Fuller, he held to the belief that "To fight without a reserve is similar to playing cards without capital - sheer gambling. To trust to the cast of dice is not generalship." "It [McClellan's plan] was extremely simple, and ought to have succeeded," wrote Francis Palfrey. Alpheus Williams, who took over command of the 12th Corps after Mansfield's wounding, takes things one step further when he writes, "If McClellan's plan had been carried out with more coolness by some of our commanding generals, we should have grabbed half their army." Palfrey and Williams could not have been more correct. Between them, Hooker, Sumner and Burnside had, by their acts and omissions, assured its failure and whereas Sumner may have been well meaning, the impetus behind Hooker's and Burnside's actions is more ambiguous if not suspect in the latter's case. There are might have beens and then there are should have beens. By all rights, The Battle of Antietam should have been a major Union victory and this to the extent that The Army of Northern Virginia should have been completely overwhelmed and Lee forced to surrender. McClellan would have been entirely aware of this fact and upon each of their reflections, so too would Hooker, Sumner, Burnside and possibly even Abraham Lincoln. In November, 1862, McClellan was relieved of command, effectively ending his Civil War career. Both Burnside and Hooker would have their own opportunity to show how it should be done during their respective Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville campaigns, each of which being unmitigated disasters. Hooker would see the war through, holding various, if not controversial, commands whereas Burnside would ultimately resign in disgrace following the Petersburg Crater fiasco. Sumner would die of a heart attack in March 1863. The guns had fallen silent at Antietam but the war would drag on for another 27 bloody months.